IAF AutoSafe™ is a Draft for Technical Review covering twelve vehicle safety and integrity domains through a proposed 1,000-point schedule, domain floors, mandatory gates and class-specific requirements.
A proposed whole-vehicle testing, assessment and labelling system built to connect crash performance, human factors, software, cybersecurity, energy hazards, post-crash response and evidence quality in one traceable decision.
Beyond the crash test. Evidence across the whole vehicle.
Conventional consumer programmes often communicate results through a compact star outcome. AutoSafe is being developed as a broader evidence architecture: one that keeps physical, digital, human-factor and post-crash responsibilities visible.
Every-domain floors and mandatory gates are intended to prevent an excellent result in one area from masking a serious weakness in another.
Functional safety, intended-function limits, software integrity, cybersecurity and architecture-specific energy hazards sit beside physical crash evidence.
The proposed class stays tied to an identified configuration, protocol edition, evidence record and verification reference - not to an entire brand or platform.
AutoSafe is being developed to help consumers, engineers, fleets and public authorities ask better safety questions. Membership, sponsorship, payment or in-kind support cannot improve a class. The ambition is to build a technically defensible framework capable of raising expectations for vehicle safety in the years ahead - subject to independent technical review, validation and formal adoption.
Twelve technical domains, presented in seven connected topic groups. Explore the evidence behind protection, prevention and integrity.
D03-D04Primary frontal, side, rear and rollover protection: the structure and restraints working together to protect occupants.
Crash energy management · Occupant injury evidence · Structural integrity
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D05Additional occupant sizes, rear-seat diversity and child protection extend the picture beyond the primary D03–D04 cases.
Child restraints · Child presence · Occupant diversity
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D06Passive and impact-activated exterior protection considers pedestrians and cyclists when contact occurs. Avoidance performance is scored separately in D02.
Head impact · Lower-extremity protection · Active exterior systems
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D01-D02Driver-state and interface evidence sit alongside measured crash avoidance, including pedestrian, cyclist and powered-two-wheeler scenarios.
Human factors · Driver monitoring · Crash avoidance
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D08-D09Functional and intended-function safety connect with cybersecurity, software integrity and controlled fallback behaviour.
Functional safety · Secure updates · Cybersecurity evidence
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D07Applicable combustion, hybrid, battery-electric, hydrogen and emerging-energy branches address the hazards of the installed architecture.
Containment · Fire and electrical hazards · Charging or refuelling
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D10-D12Post-crash rescue and escape, initial production-baseline equivalence, and evidence traceability complete the assessment picture.
Rescue and escape · Production equivalence · Reproducible evidence
Explore this areaProposed evidence areas above remain subject to the released protocols. Each performance outcome has a defined scoring home. Pedestrian and cyclist avoidance belongs to D02; passive and impact-activated exterior protection belongs to D06. The same outcome is never scored twice.
The proposed class connects valid evidence, every-domain floors, mandatory gates and independent review. Its meaning stays tied to the configuration and assessment conditions.
Discover the proposed reportCompetence, independence and reproducibility — before a result can become a trusted decision.
The proposed routes span crash and sled facilities, proving grounds, energy-system laboratories and cybersecurity benches. Relevant laboratory activities require demonstrated competence and ISO/IEC 17025 accreditation where applicable.
Explore the facility modelRelevant competence and methods, not a blanket laboratory designation.
Calibration, instrumentation, uncertainty and data formats under released protocols.
Correlation, reviewer competence and repeatability evidence before release.
Clear separation from manufacturer interests and secure evidence handling.
Facility scope, calibrated methods, laboratory correlation and operational release requirements must be established before authorised ratings can be issued. The draft does not designate a live approved laboratory network.
A proposed common language for consumers, manufacturers and public authorities — connecting a clear safety outcome with the evidence behind it.
After programme release, an assessed A–F class would be presented with the configuration, edition, assessment envelope, limitations and verification record.
Explore the proposed safety label
Domain-level evidence identifies improvement areas for a named generation and controlled configuration family — not an entire brand or platform. Relevant changes are reviewed against the assessed baseline.
Understand the assessment scopeThe framework is being developed to support future policy, procurement and fleet-safety decisions through configuration-specific, traceable evidence. Operational results are not yet available.
See the proposed reporting modelStructured evidence, transparent decision rules and a configuration-specific scope.
Not a substitute for homologation, not a blanket brand endorsement and not yet an operational rating programme.
Controlled evidence first. A defensible decision only after scope, validity, points, every-domain floors, gates and independent review.
Identify the generation, configurations, market, equipment, energy architecture, hardware and software before fixing the twelve-domain applicability and evidence plan.
Competent facilities execute released methods within their demonstrated scope. ISO/IEC 17025 accreditation applies to relevant laboratory activities where applicable.
The proposed twelve-domain schedule is evaluated against total thresholds, the floor in every domain, mandatory gates and class-specific requirements. A high total cannot bypass a critical weakness.
Modifiers or caps apply only where specified by the released protocol. Initial production-equivalence evidence is distinct from the point total; D11 does not create a scheduled IAF audit cycle.
After technical validation, formal adoption and operational release, eligible assessments may lead to a Vehicle Test and Rating Certificate, supporting report and authorised label record. The current draft does not authorise operational ratings or labels. F and Unrated are different statuses.
IAF-SS-V1 · First Edition — Draft for Technical Review. Explore the twelve domains, proposed class thresholds, evidence rules and mandatory gates. Technical validation and formal adoption remain pending.