



IAF SNR | SERVICE NETWORKS | FIRST EDITION

SERVICE OPERATIONS & EVIDENCE MANUAL

Practical control of customer consent, repair quality,
technical release and network evidence.

PREPARED FOR IAF ADOPTION

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Authorised Service Networks
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Document control

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Hierarchy	Standard including internal directives and normative annexes; adopted implementation notice within those rules; Status and Mark Rules; Audit and Service Operations Manuals; Applicant Guide; controlled forms.
Authority boundary	Corporate implementation assurance. Manufacturer service appointments, vehicle approvals and other IAF programme decisions remain distinct.
Control	Retain exact scope and criterion versions. Protect completed records, personal information and service evidence.

Purpose and use

Practical control of customer consent, repair quality, technical release and network evidence.

Shall denotes a requirement; should guidance; may permission. Examples are illustrative unless a normative provision expressly establishes a rule. No checklist score can compensate for failed safety, integrity, competence or an unsupported scope.

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TM01 Construct a defensible service assurance case

Implementation and evidence

An assurance case connects a bounded claim to facts and a reasoned conclusion. Start with the legal entity, outlet, service family, technology and evidence period. State the outcome being demonstrated, such as reliable completion and independent release of a particular repair family, rather than a vague claim of excellent service.

For each claim identify the adopted requirement, responsible owner, original evidence, check and limitation. Use a mix of observed practice, real job records, worker explanation and customer outcomes. Preserve adverse evidence. A large manual can establish a system description but cannot show that a particular outlet actually follows it.

Verification and practical application

Consider a workshop claiming battery service. Distinguish routine work near an electrified vehicle from battery removal, internal repair and software intervention. Each has different competence, tools and evidence. A broad label becomes credible only when its detailed task boundary and exclusions can be verified.

Use the Self-Assessment Dossier as the narrative index, the Scope Schedule as the boundary and the Job Dossier as an evidence chain. The checklist records the assessment result against each requirement. None of these records alone is the recognition decision; independent review and panel authorisation complete the case.

TM02 Define entities, outlets and service families

Implementation and evidence

Create stable identifiers for each legal entity, centre, fixed outlet, mobile unit and remote technical hub. Record ownership and who contracts with customers. An outsourced specialist is identified as a provider unless separately included and assessed; listing a provider in a job does not confer corporate recognition on it.

A family groups services with sufficiently common methods, competence and release controls. Routine maintenance, structural joining, battery-internal work and protected programming should not be pooled merely because they concern the same vehicle brand. Record the technical basis and material differences within each family.

Verification and practical application

Example: a network has a centre and three outlets, but only one outlet performs structural repair. The public schedule names that outlet and the structural family explicitly. A customer visiting another outlet can see that its general maintenance scope does not include the structural capability of its sister location.

The six-month operating history and three completed-job gate apply to each family/site. Shared procedures and central training can support local capability but do not replace local evidence. Scope extension should follow actual capability, with planned investment and future services shown outside active coverage.

TM03 Verify service authorisation without ambiguity

Implementation and evidence

Create an authorisation register showing issuer, instrument, legal holder, brand, location, activities, territory, effective/expiry dates and conditions. Retain a reliable confirmation route and responsible reviewer. A parts purchase account, training record or displayed emblem does not by itself establish a service appointment.

Keep underlying authorisation separate from IAF recognition. An outlet may be permitted to perform one brand activity while independently providing other lawful services. Describe these accurately. Do not use the phrase authorised service centre without identifying the relevant authority and technical boundary in the supporting record.

Verification and practical application

Example: an appointment allows mechanical repairs but excludes body repair and battery-internal work. Record those exclusions in both the local offer and recognition scope. If the outlet later acquires the missing capability, obtain the necessary underlying permission where required and complete the SNR extension gates before changing active claims.

Review expiry, transfer restrictions, changes of ownership and lost technical access. A withdrawn appointment triggers immediate removal of the affected authorisation claim and assessment of its effect on recognition. Independent services may remain supportable only where their lawful access, competence and technical controls are actually demonstrated.

TM04 Make network contracts operational

Implementation and evidence

Participation contracts should identify the customer-contracting entity, central oversight, outlet duties, original-record access, customer remedy, incident notice and claim removal. Specify enforceable consequences for non-cooperation. A quality policy signed by the centre is insufficient if a franchisee can refuse essential audit or corrective action.

Establish escalation and cross-outlet recovery for abandoned work, repeated repairs and complaints with unclear ownership. Identify who can authorise a remedy and communicate with the customer. Financial arrangements between network parties should not leave the customer without a responsible case owner.

Verification and practical application

Test a realistic failure: an outlet departs while a warranty complaint remains open. Trace record access, parts custody, technical investigation and the responsible remedy party. Record whether the centre can enforce the agreed handover. Correct contractual gaps before they become a live customer problem.

Compare central instructions with local execution. Review at least one adverse case, local staffing decision and scope claim at each outlet. Network-wide corrective action should address common causes but be adapted to the actual local technology and conditions; copying a message to every outlet does not prove implementation.

TM05 Design intake, diagnosis and consent as one trace

Implementation and evidence

Use one job identity from booking through handover. Verify the person authorised to request work, vehicle identity, reported concern, condition and relevant custody arrangements. Separate driver, owner, fleet approver, insurer and payer where different. Record only the information needed for the transaction and technical investigation.

Diagnosis should follow a reasoned sequence of symptoms, hypotheses, tests and conclusions. Preserve the initial condition and material fault information. Explain uncertainty and obtain approval for staged investigation when the cause is not established. A replacement part is an action; it is not evidence that the original diagnosis was correct.

Verification and practical application

For each estimate version record work, parts class, price basis, timing, technical limitations and actual approval. A revised finding can change the scope or cost. Contact the authorised person before the material change and retain the channel, timestamp and limits of the decision. Silence does not create a general permission.

Example: a customer authorises investigation only. A test identifies a likely component fault but disassembly may expose additional damage. The next estimate explains both the proposed work and uncertainty. The approved boundary is recorded before proceeding, and the final invoice is reconciled to the actual authorised work.

TM06 Control critical work without inventing repair instructions

Implementation and evidence

This programme specifies assurance, accountability and evidence. It does not prescribe universal torque values, electrical isolation times, pressure settings, structural sectioning limits or battery emergency tactics. Obtain the appropriate current technical method for the exact vehicle and task, and use competent personnel within their authorised limits.

Translate the technical method into a job plan with required parts, tools, conditions, hold points and acceptance criteria. Identify checks that must occur before work becomes concealed or irreversible. Ensure interruptions and shift changes preserve the vehicle state and outstanding release holds.

Verification and practical application

For a safety-critical operation, identify a competent checker who did not perform the steps being verified. The check must examine meaningful evidence at the necessary time. A second signature at the end of an incomplete job does not substitute for observation or objective results required before closure.

When instructions are missing, contradictory or inapplicable to previous modifications, stop the affected task and obtain a competent technical disposition. Document any limitations and safe referral. Customer consent and managerial approval do not create technical validity for an unsupported critical repair.

TM07 Parts provenance, substitution and reverse tracing

Implementation and evidence

Record part identity, revision, condition, source and vehicle compatibility. Distinguish genuine-source claims from general suitability claims and preserve evidence for each. New, remanufactured, reused and customer-supplied parts require truthful disclosure and an appropriate technical acceptance decision; appearance alone does not prove identity.

Link safety-relevant serial or batch information and critical consumables to jobs. Segregate rejected stock and returned items. Control shelf life, packaging, contamination and any single-use restrictions in the applicable method. Supplier paperwork should be checked against the actual received item and intended application.

Verification and practical application

Run a reverse-trace exercise from a suspect batch to all potentially affected jobs, stock and outsourced work. Record how the boundary was defined, any uncertain records, customer contact capability and time needed. A trace exercise with a preselected perfect record is less informative than one using a randomly selected real batch.

Example: a purchased batch has uncertain identity after a supplier alert. Hold unused items, identify fitted jobs, assess actual risk and select a competent remedy. Preserve the uncertainty rather than declare every fitted part defective or safe without evidence. Track customer outreach and verified completion separately.

TM08 Equipment and measurement decisions

Implementation and evidence

Map tools and measuring equipment to the decisions they support. Define required capacity, accuracy, condition and verification intervals, considering risk and use. Verify software configuration and accessories as part of the measurement system. A current label is useful only when the instrument is suitable for the actual task.

For acceptance near a limit, consider measurement uncertainty and the approved decision rule. Record the measured value, conditions and uncertainty where material. Do not repeatedly measure until a favourable result appears, round away a failure or substitute a general workshop tolerance for the applicable technical requirement.

Verification and practical application

Illustrative decision only: where a validated maximum is 10.0 units and uncertainty is 0.2 units, a conservative rule accepts only if result plus uncertainty is at most 10.0. A result of 9.7 passes; 10.1 is inconclusive; 10.3 fails because result minus uncertainty exceeds the limit. These are examples, not vehicle specifications.

If a critical tool is found unreliable, identify its last known acceptable state and jobs measured since then. Evaluate the actual consequence, obtain independent checks and document customer actions where needed. Recalibrating the tool repairs future capability; it does not automatically validate earlier work.

TM09 Electrical and battery service assurance

Implementation and evidence

Divide electrical capability into explicit task groups and authorise people accordingly. The service scope should distinguish ordinary work on an electrified vehicle, controlled electrical tasks, battery handling and battery-internal repair. Keep the exact technical instructions and competent supervision available for the activity performed.

For received batteries, record identity, known history, observed condition, uncertainty and a competent handling/disposition plan. Damaged or suspect units require condition-specific controls and escalation. Do not use a fixed generic waiting period, absence of visible damage or an isolated electrical connection as proof of safety.

Verification and practical application

For a supported repair, retain the applicable method, component identity, essential process evidence and post-work acceptance. A capacity or health estimate must state its method, conditions and limitations. It should not be sold as a guarantee of remaining service life, driving range or freedom from future failure.

Check both worker protection and the quality conclusion. The assessor evaluates whether competent people follow valid methods and preserve evidence; the audit does not become a substitute technical repair procedure. Unsupported live work, repurposing or component modification remains outside active scope until a valid basis is established.

TM10 ADAS and electronically controlled functions

Implementation and evidence

Determine calibration and relearn needs from the actual vehicle, configuration, repair and technical instruction. Record the trigger and method version. Glass replacement, geometry changes or sensor disturbance may require further work depending on the actual system; avoid a universal assumption that every job needs the same procedure.

Preserve setup evidence and method-specific conditions such as geometry, target identity, loading, environment and software. Keep failed attempts and their correction. A green completion message does not prove that the setup was valid or that every related function was assessed.

Verification and practical application

Link pre-work findings, actual intervention and post-work verification. Unexplained faults need a technical disposition, and functional tests must be performed in safe suitable conditions. Where a required condition is unavailable, record the limitation and defer the affected conclusion rather than treating a substitute test as equivalent without validation.

Explain the outcome in bounded language: the specified service and affected functions were checked using the identified method. Avoid implying that calibration establishes unrestricted automated driving capability or guarantees collision prevention. Customer handover should preserve relevant warnings and operational limitations.

TM11 Collision, structural and restraint work

Implementation and evidence

Begin with damage analysis and a supported repairability decision for the exact materials, structure and restraint systems. Identify uncertain prior repairs and hidden damage. Technical permission to repair is distinct from the commercial estimate and insurer payment decision; neither cost nor customer preference validates a prohibited operation.

For irreversible work, qualify personnel, equipment, materials and essential process conditions. Record checks before concealment and preserve traceability for critical materials and single-use items. Changes to the proposed method need competent review and any necessary revised customer approval.

Verification and practical application

Assess interactions with sensors, wiring, battery systems, corrosion protection, glazing and restraints. Specify relevant diagnostic, dimensional and functional checks. A visually acceptable finish or successful road test cannot establish hidden joining quality when the required process evidence is absent.

Independent release should reconcile all critical hold points and affected interfaces, with clear limitations. Where essential evidence is missing, keep a hold and determine a valid safe remedy or referral. Do not issue a vehicle-wide safety statement based solely on the particular collision repair performed.

TM12 Software, remote sessions and secure vehicle access

Implementation and evidence

Confirm both customer authority and technical entitlement before remote access or programming. Individual credentials, least necessary privileges and session logs support accountability. Security-related work requires appropriate verification of the requesting party; possession of a diagnostic account alone does not grant authority over every vehicle.

Before intervention, confirm actual configuration, authorised software source, applicable version, licence, safe state and recovery plan. Explain material changes to features or service availability. The process should handle interrupted or partial outcomes without converting a server-side completion message into proof of vehicle-side success.

Verification and practical application

After intervention, retrieve the actual installed state and relevant functional results. Link remote and local records where physical checks are needed. Close access and revoke temporary privileges. Preserve failed attempts and anomalies so a later investigator can reconstruct the real sequence.

Example: a remote specialist reports programming complete, but the local vehicle remains in a fault state. The job stays on hold while configuration and required checks are resolved. The remote ticket, customer invoice and technical release are separate records and should not automatically close one another.

TM13 Heavy vehicles, specialist equipment and adapted mobility

Implementation and evidence

Define the actual vehicle and duty profile, including trailer, body, auxiliary systems and adaptations. Map maintenance and release responsibilities across connected systems. A chassis service does not establish the condition of specialist body equipment or accessibility functions outside the assessed scope.

Confirm suitable lifting, support, handling, test capacity and competent staff for the actual configuration. Fleet downtime pressure can distort decisions; maintain independent critical checking and realistic scheduling. State when work must be referred because the outlet cannot safely support the task.

Verification and practical application

For adapted controls and accessibility devices, establish the technical requirement and affected interfaces with the authorised customer or responsible party. Verify actual function through suitable competent methods. The service conclusion does not determine medical fitness or suitability for every individual user.

Use clear handover between driver, fleet controller, owner and payer. Communicate material unresolved concerns to the responsible party and preserve safe disposition. A central fleet contract must not prevent prompt warning about a significant safety issue affecting the vehicle being released.

TM14 Mobile, roadside and recovery controls

Implementation and evidence

Treat each mobile unit as an identified operational site with bounded equipment and crew capability. Record its responsible base, technologies, territories and service limits. A central call centre cannot create recognition coverage for independent responders not included and assessed in the schedule.

Assess the actual work location before proceeding: access, traffic, ground, weather, communication and emergency arrangements affect what can be safely done. Use competent task-specific methods and stop or relocate when necessary. A customer's urgency does not convert unsuitable roadside conditions into an acceptable workshop.

Verification and practical application

For recovery, verify the vehicle configuration, damage and energy state and choose an appropriate current technical method. Pass essential hazards and restrictions to the receiving party. Successful transport alone does not establish technical safety or authorise the next repair step.

Offline records should preserve original event times, customer consent and vehicle state, with controlled later synchronisation. Where a necessary independent critical check cannot be performed effectively in the field, defer technical release and use a lawful safe alternative. Do not replace the check with a remote signature unsupported by evidence.

TM15 Final verification and customer-declined work

Implementation and evidence

Create release criteria from the actual job, including disturbed systems, critical steps, relevant diagnostics, measurements and functional checks. Identify who is authorised to release and who independently verifies critical work. Avoid a single generic tick box that conceals different technical acceptance duties.

If a test drive is required, establish lawful authority, competent driver, suitable conditions, readiness and limits before movement. Preserve the outcome and anomalies. A drive that does not reproduce a symptom may support diagnosis but does not prove that every underlying cause has been excluded.

Verification and practical application

Where a customer declines a necessary repair, distinguish completed authorised work, the known unresolved concern and the lawful disposition. Explain risks clearly and offer reasonable safe alternatives. A signature records communication; it neither makes an unsafe repair conforming nor establishes an unrestricted right to hold the vehicle.

The handover should state what was done and checked, what remains, warranty and follow-up arrangements, and whom to contact. Do not label a service release as a statutory roadworthiness decision unless a separately authorised process actually provides that result. Corporate recognition does not certify each individual vehicle.

TM16 Define indicators that reveal failures

Implementation and evidence

Define each indicator before collecting it: event, denominator, period, attribution window, exclusions and source. Separate completed repair jobs from estimates, cancelled bookings and pure inspections where the metric concerns repair success. Publish internal outlet variation as well as network totals and preserve data-quality limitations.

For a first-time-fix measure, choose a stated follow-up window, such as 30 calendar days, and link related returns across outlets. Distinguish confirmed repeat faults from unrelated new concerns through technical review. Recent jobs without a complete window form an immature cohort and should not be counted as proven successes.

Verification and practical application

Illustrative cohort: 200 completed eligible repairs have all reached the 30-day window; 18 have a confirmed related repeat. First-time fix is $(200 \text{ minus } 18) \text{ divided by } 200$, or 91%. A further 40 recent repairs are reported separately. Deleting or renaming repeat jobs would invalidate the metric.

For 24 complaints among 1,200 completed jobs, complaint incidence is 2 per 100 jobs. Report severity and verified remedy completion alongside this rate; a low count may reflect inaccessible complaint channels. For on-time completion, preserve the original commitment and distinguish customer-approved revised timing from a retrospectively edited promise.

TM17 Sample evidence and calculate audit effort

Implementation and evidence

Three completed jobs per family/site is the minimum evidence floor, not a claim of statistical confidence. Select independently from the population, including adverse cases, changed technology and different workers or shifts. Expand the sample when results conflict, grouping is weak or a consequential failure appears.

Example: three outlets each perform two distinct families. At least 3 outlets times 2 families times 3 jobs gives 18 job traces. A single job can support multiple criteria, but counting it in two families needs a real technical basis and must not hide the absence of three completed jobs in either family.

Verification and practical application

Duration example: the centre requires 2 auditor-days; Outlet A with 40 effective workers requires 2; Outlet B with 180 requires 3, plus 1 for material novel critical technology and 1 for complex critical outsourcing. Total floor is 9 auditor-days. Additional scope or evidence weakness can require more; this is not a cap.

One auditor-day is eight assessment hours excluding travel. Do not count one hour simultaneously against two required activities. Each site receives at least a full operating day, with at least half on-site time for observation, witnessing and interviews. A combined centre/outlet visit can share logistics but cannot double-count the required hours.

TM18 Trace incidents and verify remedies

Implementation and evidence

An incident response starts with protection and evidence preservation, not a completed cause report. Establish awareness time, affected jobs, plausible shared factors and immediate actions. Notify IAF within 48 hours for serious incidents while meeting any earlier emergency, customer or applicable reporting duty.

Define the affected population using method, technician, tool, part, software, outlet and time boundaries as relevant. Explain uncertainty. A narrow population requires evidence; a network-wide precaution may be justified while facts are incomplete, but should be reviewed proportionately as reliable information develops.

Verification and practical application

Track contact attempts, technical review, agreed remedy and verified completion separately. Example: 100 potentially affected jobs are identified, 90 customers contacted, 70 remedies completed and 10 found unaffected through documented technical review. Do not report 90% remedy completion by equating contact with correction; disclose all categories and remaining uncertainty.

Independent verification should test whether the cause is removed and the remedy works, including adverse follow-up. Restart requires competent authority and evidence. Share lessons to other outlets using the same method, then verify local applicability and implementation rather than treating a network email as completed action.

TM19 Privacy, record retention and continuity

Implementation and evidence

Draw the data path from customer contact to vehicle diagnostics, providers, cloud systems and archive. Identify purpose, access and transfer basis for each category. Raw location history or personal media may be unnecessary even when technical diagnostic results are essential. Collect and expose the least information needed.

Retain technical service evidence at least ten years after job closure unless a binding limit requires a different period; document the rule and its effect. Separate or pseudonymise personal identifiers when no longer needed, and use lawful holds only for an identified reason. Ten-year technical retention is not a blanket instruction to retain every personal-data field.

Verification and practical application

Test restoration of complete job relationships, not only files: consent versions, part links, timestamps, attachments, holds and releases must remain coherent. After an outage, reconcile temporary records with actual vehicle state before restarting normal dispatch or handover.

For a closed or departed outlet, identify who lawfully retains records, who can investigate a complaint and how customers obtain necessary information. Review access after staff exit and platform migration. A network that loses essential evidence at every franchise change cannot sustain its assurance claim.

TM20 Prepare future capability and improve the programme

Implementation and evidence

Future services may involve autonomous fleet depots, remote interventions, predictive diagnosis and new energy systems. Describe the intended task and interfaces before claiming capability. Establish specific competence, technical authority, operating limits and evidence; a future technology label is not a reason to waive core gates.

For automated decision support, validate representative and adverse cases, record uncertainty and provide a usable human challenge route. Monitor changed inputs, tool updates and uneven outcomes. Do not permit an algorithm to silently replace consent, independent safety checking or accountable release.

Verification and practical application

Example: an autonomous fleet platform schedules vehicles directly from service software. Test whether a release hold blocks dispatch, whether delayed synchronisation preserves the restrictive state and who authorises the final transition. A successful network message alone does not establish the vehicle's physical condition.

Review failures, complaints, pilots and assessment consistency through annual operator assurance and an independent review at least every three years. Build international acceptance with demonstrable outcomes and transparent limits. Claims of universal recognition or superiority require evidence and are not created by ambitious document wording.