



FIRST EDITION

IAF AUTOID

Vehicle Identity and Homologation Evidence Standard

Requirements for persistent model identity, jurisdiction-specific evidence assurance and lifecycle traceability.

PROPOSED FOR IAF ADOPTION

Operational effect requires recorded IAF authorization. Version 1.0.
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International Automotive Federation

English master text

iaf.com

Document control

This standard defines 120 mandatory controls for operating AUTOID and issuing scoped records. It establishes what an identity means, what evidence must support a claim, who may decide and how the result remains traceable after product or regulatory change.

Control	Value
Programme	IAF AUTOID
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Control	English master; printed and downloaded copies checked against the current controlled edition

Use of this document

This package defines an IAF scheme and its implementation. It does not represent existing regulatory delegation, external acceptance or a live database. Pilot and operational records must be distinguished. The accountable operator shall activate only the markets, categories and functions approved through the release gate.

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Conformity and reading rules

An operator claiming conformity shall satisfy all applicable controls AID-01.01 to AID-24.05, including representative case evidence. A case assessment uses the controls marked Both for its requested identity, model, configuration or vehicle scope, and relies on a conforming operator for the controls marked Operator. Operator-only controls shall be linked to the current operator assessment, not silently treated as waived.

The case manager shall establish applicability before assessment. Requirements concerning a vehicle, software function, battery, production population or exceptional route may be not applicable only where the scope and reason are documented and independently reviewed. All sentences within an applicable control are mandatory. Missing evidence, cost or lack of staff is not a basis for not applicable.

A positive conformity claim requires every applicable control to be conforming or justified not applicable, with no unresolved finding affecting the claimed scope. A critical flag in the checklist indicates need for immediate containment when credible severe risk exists; it does not make other controls optional. Identity-only publication is a separate outcome with no unassessed technical claim.

Expected evidence below is a practical audit aid. Equivalent evidence may be accepted only when it establishes the complete requirement and any statutory source requirement. The standard takes precedence over an abbreviated checklist prompt. Service intervals introduced here are proposed IAF requirements; they are not representations of a universal legal deadline.

Terms and definitions

Term	Meaning
AUTOID	A persistent identifier allocated within the IAF registry namespace; it has no inherent approval meaning.
Model	Manufacturer-controlled engineering product family; it may map to multiple regulatory types or territories.
Variant	Defined technical subdivision of a model used to select configurations and evidence.
Configuration	Frozen approval-relevant hardware and software baseline; a real material product change creates a new identity.
Vehicle	One physical vehicle, normally bound to a VIN and an as-built configuration.
Homologation evidence	Records of the legally applicable approval, certification or exemption pathway; the source remains authoritative.
Jurisdiction profile	Versioned market, category, route and dated requirement package used to evaluate a case.
Assertion	A scoped statement by an identified issuer about a subject, supported by evidence and an independent decision where required.
Verification	A defined check of identity, source, integrity, scope or status; the checked property must always be stated.
Technical conformity	Meeting the applicable technical requirements for a specified scope, configuration and legal route.
AUTOID scheme conformity	Meeting this standard for the stated registry or case scope; it is not an unrestricted legal conformity guarantee.
Current	Within the declared source-check and review interval with no known blocking event; not omniscient or continuously guaranteed.
Critical finding	Credible severe safety, identity, fraud, privacy or integrity risk, or a knowingly false approval claim; immediate containment is required.
Major finding	A missing or ineffective required control, unreliable decision evidence or systemic failure affecting the claimed scope.
Minor finding	An isolated requirement failure without immediate material invalidation; it still requires closure before a new positive claim that includes it.
Not applicable	A requirement excluded by an approved factual and legal rationale; missing evidence is not a reason for this classification.

Term	Meaning
Tombstone	Minimal historical record preventing reuse and explaining retirement or supersession without retaining unnecessary personal data.
Shall should may	Shall is mandatory for conformity; should is recommended; may is permitted. Informative examples do not waive shall requirements.

01 Purpose authority and permitted claims

AUTOID establishes a persistent technical identity and a traceable account of conformity evidence. It supports international vehicle approval work through jurisdiction-specific records and accountable decisions. It is not a universal statutory registration or ownership register.

AID-01.01 Scheme boundary

The operator shall publish the legal entity responsible for AUTOID, its service boundaries and each approved vehicle category. A registry record shall not be represented as permission to manufacture, import, sell, register or operate a vehicle. Any public mandate shall be separately verified and displayed with its territory, function, conditions and expiry.

Expected evidence: Approved programme charter; legal operator record; mandate register; public claim review. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-01.02 Conformity meaning

An AUTOID scheme conformity statement shall mean that the declared record and its evidence meet this standard for a named scope. It shall not mean that IAF has independently tested every regulatory requirement or that every country accepts the vehicle. The statement shall identify the configuration, jurisdiction profile, review date, limitations and decision issuer.

Expected evidence: Statement template; completed decision; exact technical and market scope. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-01.03 Constitutional authority

The Presidential Council shall authorize programme establishment, resources and publication in accordance with the effective IAF Constitution. Technical committees shall develop requirements through their mandates. Competent independent functions shall review and decide cases. Corporate authorization shall not permit the President, Council, sponsor or committee to direct an individual technical result.

Expected evidence: Council resolution; current delegation register; separated assessment and decision appointments. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-01.04 Document precedence

Mandatory law and binding public mandates shall prevail. The effective Constitution shall govern corporate powers; this standard shall govern AUTOID technical requirements; the manual shall govern execution; the checklist shall record verification. A conflict shall be logged and resolved before the affected activity proceeds. A checklist answer shall never waive a requirement.

Expected evidence: Controlled master list; precedence review; conflict disposition and effective editions. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-01.05 Operating release

Before operational issuance, the Council shall authorize a release with approved requirements, named accountable officers, competent assessors, independent decision capacity, security and privacy acceptance, funded continuity and a tested registry. Pilot records shall remain segregated and visibly identified as non-operational. Publication of this proposed First Edition alone shall not activate the service.

Expected evidence: Signed release gate; pilot segregation test; staffing and continuity evidence. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

02 Participation independence and fairness

Global participation depends on predictable entry criteria, accessible technical rules and decisions that cannot be purchased. Membership administration and technical assurance have separate outcomes.

AID-02.01 Participation conditions

The operator shall publish eligibility by service and territory. Where IAF membership is required by the adopted framework, it shall be checked as an administrative condition and shall not count as evidence of vehicle conformity. Non-member access required by law, scheme rules or a recognition agreement shall be enabled. Public verification shall not require membership.

Expected evidence: Published eligibility; membership gate; non-member exception route; anonymous verification test.

Assessment scope: Both.

AID-02.02 Conflict review

Personnel shall declare relevant ownership, employment, consultancy, family and financial interests on appointment, annually and before each case. The person who assessed, advised on, sold or materially influenced a case shall not decide it or hear its appeal. The conflict reviewer shall record exclusions, access restrictions and replacement assignments.

Expected evidence: Case declarations; reviewer and decision maker identities; recusal and access logs. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-02.03 Equal treatment

The operator shall apply the same evidence rules to small manufacturers, large groups, importers and regional applicants within the same scope. Fees, sponsorship, federation office or market importance shall not change the decision threshold. Translation, phased submission and accessible support may reduce administrative burden without lowering technical requirements.

Expected evidence: Published service rules; sampled comparable cases; fee and decision separation. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-02.04 Competition safeguards

Committee and registry access shall not expose competitors to confidential pricing, forward production plans, bid information or unnecessary technical trade secrets. Shared datasets shall use minimum necessary fields and aggregation where appropriate. Meetings shall have an agenda, conflict controls and an escalation route for improper information exchange.

Expected evidence: Data-sharing rules; meeting records; competitor access tests; approved publication fields. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-02.05 Accountable decisions

Every refusal, restriction or withdrawal shall identify the rule, evidence, responsible function and route to challenge. Applicants shall have an opportunity to correct factual errors and respond to findings, except that documented urgent protective action may precede the full response. No user shall face retaliation for raising a substantiated concern.

Expected evidence: Decision notices; response opportunities; protected reporting arrangements. **Assessment scope:** Both.

03 Scope terminology and object boundaries

A marketing model, a regulatory type, a production configuration and an individual vehicle are distinct objects. The registry shall preserve those distinctions across markets and through the product lifecycle.

AID-03.01 Object classification

Every identified object shall be classified as organization, model, variant, configuration, vehicle, component, software or facility. Components shall additionally state type, batch or individual-instance granularity. An application shall state which classes are in scope and which are excluded. An unimplemented extension shall not be claimed as an operational capability.

Expected evidence: Object inventory; requested classes; component granularity; exclusions. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-03.02 Model definition

A model shall be a manufacturer-controlled engineering product family with a documented boundary. Its identifier shall remain stable through marketing renaming and normal model-year updates. A new family, different responsible manufacturer or unresolvable boundary shall receive a separate model identity with a relationship to the earlier object. Marketing names alone shall not establish equivalence.

Expected evidence: Family definition; responsible manufacturer; platform and design history; duplicate search. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-03.03 Regulatory type mapping

The model-to-regulatory-type relationship shall be recorded as a versioned many-to-many mapping. Each mapping shall state the market, legal category, authority or declaration route and supported variants and configurations. A shared platform or brand shall not transfer an approval from one legal manufacturer or regulatory type to another.

Expected evidence: Type mapping register; source approval or declaration; approved configuration range. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-03.04 Category boundary

Each market profile shall define the relevant road vehicle categories and applicable limits. Passenger cars, buses, trucks, trailers, powered two-wheelers, agricultural vehicles and special-purpose or off-road machines shall not be treated as interchangeable. An inactive category shall remain outside the available conformity scope until its profile and assessor competence are approved.

Expected evidence: Category classification rationale; market profile; assessor authorization scope. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-03.05 Prototype and exceptional vehicles

Prototypes, individual imports, small series, historical vehicles and incomplete vehicles shall use explicit pathways with their own evidence requirements and restrictions. A prototype may hold an identity record but shall not inherit a production-market claim. An exemption shall identify its issuing authority, affected requirement, conditions and temporal limits.

Expected evidence: Prototype flag; exceptional route; authority exemption; restricted statement. **Assessment scope:** Both.

04 Responsible organizations and trusted issuers

The registry must know who is entitled to submit a record, who produced the evidence and who can act for the manufacturer. A logo or uploaded certificate is not sufficient identity verification.

AID-04.01 Organization verification

Before accepting a submission, the registrar shall verify legal name, registration reference, jurisdiction of establishment, business contact and authorized representative using independent sources. The legal operator and manufacturer shall be distinct fields where they differ. A verified organization record shall not be described as technical accreditation or vehicle approval.

Expected evidence: Independent legal-entity check; organization record; representative authorization. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-04.02 Manufacturer responsibility

Each model shall identify the legal manufacturer responsible for design and conformity obligations and the authorized data steward. Importer, distributor, assembler and brand-owner roles shall be recorded separately. A contractual brand licence shall not transfer regulatory responsibility unless the applicable law and authoritative documents establish that transfer.

Expected evidence: Role allocation; contracts; manufacturer declarations; authorized source records. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-04.03 Issuer trust registry

The operator shall maintain an issuer register covering approval authorities, manufacturers, laboratories, technical services and IAF decision functions. It shall state verified identity, permitted evidence types, scope, authorization basis, verification channel, effective dates and current trust status. A listed issuer shall not automatically be trusted for every field or territory.

Expected evidence: Issuer directory; scope verification; trusted communication channels; status changes. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-04.04 Delegation control

A submitter acting for another organization shall provide a current mandate defining objects, data rights and permitted actions. Subdelegation shall require explicit permission. Revocation shall stop new submissions under that mandate and trigger review of pending cases; it shall not silently erase historical submissions that were validly made.

Expected evidence: Signed mandate; delegation scope; expiry and revocation test. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-04.05 Organizational change

Merger, insolvency, sale of a brand or loss of representative authority shall trigger a stewardship review. Original issuer and manufacturer histories shall remain intact. Responsibility for current updates shall transfer only after documentary verification and independent authorization; unresolved responsibility shall be visible as a restriction on affected claims.

Expected evidence: Change evidence; transfer decision; successor link; open obligations. **Assessment scope:** Both.

05 Identifier allocation and duplicate prevention

AUTOID identifiers carry identity, not approval meaning. Their value comes from controlled assignment and the records they resolve to. Existing VINs, manufacturer codes and official approval numbers remain intact.

AID-05.01 Identifier syntax

An AUTOID entity identifier shall use AID, one class code and a lowercase version-4 UUID separated by hyphens, for example AID-M-123e4567-e89b-42d3-a456-426614174000. Class codes O M V C U P S F respectively denote organization, model, variant, configuration, vehicle, component, software and facility. UUIDs shall use a cryptographically suitable random generator and a uniqueness constraint.

Expected evidence: Format validation; generation design; class mapping; database uniqueness test. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-05.02 Permanence

An allocated identifier shall never be reassigned to another object, reused after retirement or changed to encode new status. Corrections shall create a new record revision. An invalidly duplicated identity shall be retained as a restricted alias or tombstone linked to the canonical record; the original event and decision shall remain auditable.

Expected evidence: Identifier lifecycle log; retired record; duplicate-resolution decision. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-05.03 Duplicate checks

Before publication the registrar shall check existing model boundaries, legal manufacturer, engineering code, external identifiers and known aliases. Automated similarity matches shall be reviewed by a competent person. Matching names alone shall not merge records. Individual-vehicle conflicts shall be quarantined until authoritative evidence resolves whether the cause is error, cloning or legitimate legacy numbering.

Expected evidence: Search results; match disposition; conflict quarantine; approved merge or separate-record rationale.

Assessment scope: Both.

AID-05.04 Concurrent issuance

Allocation shall be transactional and idempotent. A retried request with the same authorized issuer, idempotency key and identical payload shall return the original result. Reusing that key with different content shall fail. Concurrent reservations shall not create multiple active identities for the same confirmed object. Regional nodes shall not independently publish unreserved identifiers.

Expected evidence: Concurrency and retry test; reservation ledger; tenant-scoped idempotency evidence. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-05.05 External identifier preservation

VINs, WMI references, approval numbers, registration references, battery passport references and supplier serials shall be stored with issuer, scheme, original spelling and validity context. AUTOID shall not assign a WMI, alter a stamped VIN or claim official identifier-issuing authority without a separate lawful mandate. Normalization shall preserve original values and an auditable transformation.

Expected evidence: External identifier records; original values; scheme-specific validation; authorized correction. **Assessment scope:** Both.

06 Model variant and product family records

Model registration creates a stable engineering reference. It must remain usable when names change across countries, when a manufacturer rebrands a product or when multiple versions share some evidence.

AID-06.01 Minimum model dossier

A model dossier shall contain the manufacturer, engineering family designation, commercial aliases, intended categories, production stage, design boundary, initial and current configurations, manufacturing facilities, responsible steward and available market profiles. Unknown values shall be explicitly unknown, with an owner and resolution date; they shall not be replaced by assumed compliant values.

Expected evidence: Model dossier; source drawings; controlled master specification; open-data register. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-06.02 Variant boundary

Each variant shall have a controlled selection rule covering relevant body, propulsion, axle, mass, seating and safety-system differences. The relationship to regulatory variants and versions shall be declared for each market. Commercial trim names shall be aliases unless they uniquely define the engineering configuration and its evidence scope.

Expected evidence: Variant matrix; engineering codes; regulatory mapping; configuration selection rules. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-06.03 Rebranding and shared platforms

Badge-engineered or contract-built vehicles shall retain distinct legal-manufacturer and commercial-brand relationships. Reuse of technical evidence shall require source-owner permission and an applicability justification for the receiving configuration. Shared platform architecture shall not by itself establish equivalence of crash, emissions, software, electrical or production performance.

Expected evidence: Rebranding agreement; evidence permission; delta assessment and receiving-model mapping. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-06.04 Model retirement

Discontinued production shall change the model lifecycle state without invalidating its historical identity. The steward shall preserve supported configurations, relevant recalls, source approval history and the route for corrections. Vehicle records shall remain individually traceable after model retirement, within lawful retention limits.

Expected evidence: Discontinuation notice; continuity plan; retained dependent vehicle records. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-06.05 Technical units and languages

Technical fields shall identify quantity, unit, test condition, tolerance and source where relevant. The canonical technical record shall use a controlled vocabulary and English field names, with labelled translations permitted. Translation shall not change limits, legal category, approval scope or uncertainty; conflicting versions shall be resolved by the recorded authoritative source.

Expected evidence: Data dictionary; unit checks; source language and translation verification. **Assessment scope:** Both.

07 Configuration baselines and software identity

Conformity evidence attaches to an exact configuration or a justified range. A record revision corrects information; a new configuration captures a real approval-relevant product change.

AID-07.01 Configuration baseline

Each assessed configuration shall be frozen with variant, hardware part and revision references, propulsion, battery where fitted, mass and geometry limits, braking and restraint systems, safety-relevant software and intended markets. Its manifest shall identify inclusions and exclusions. Evidence shall link to this immutable baseline or a formally justified configuration range.

Expected evidence: Signed configuration manifest; engineering bill of materials; evidence-to-baseline links. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-07.02 New configuration rule

A change that may affect a regulatory result, safety function, emissions, energy storage, cybersecurity, operational design domain or declared performance shall create a new configuration identity before a positive claim is extended. A clerical correction may create a record revision if the physical and logical product is unchanged and the rationale is approved.

Expected evidence: Change classification; before-and-after comparison; new configuration or correction decision. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-07.03 Software release

Safety-relevant software shall identify supplier, release identifier, build or artifact digest, supported hardware, update dependencies and release authorization. Confidential binaries and signing secrets shall remain restricted. A software label that cannot distinguish materially different builds shall not establish the baseline. Rollback compatibility and unsupported releases shall be recorded.

Expected evidence: Software release manifest; artifact digest; compatibility and rollback evidence. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-07.04 OTA and function activation

Over-the-air updates, remote feature activation and changed calibration shall be assessed before claiming continued conformity. The review shall address affected requirements, authorization by the responsible manufacturer, required authority action, deployment eligibility and recovery. AUTOID shall record the change and evidence; it shall not remotely control vehicles or authorize an unsafe deployment.

Expected evidence: Update impact assessment; approvals; release plan; affected-vehicle range and confirmation. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-07.05 Automation and learning systems

For automated driving or adaptive systems, the dossier shall identify supported operating conditions, driver responsibilities, sensing and software baseline, fallback strategy, validation evidence and change controls. A model identifier shall not imply permission for autonomous operation. Any post-deployment learning that changes safety-relevant behaviour shall trigger the configuration and jurisdiction review rules.

Expected evidence: Operational design domain; validation scope; safety-relevant change assessment; market restrictions.

Assessment scope: Both.

08 Individual vehicles and lifecycle linkage

A model identity is not a vehicle identity. Individual records connect the built vehicle to its production configuration and to later events without publishing the owner or travel history.

AID-08.01 Vehicle binding

A vehicle identity shall be linked to its verified VIN or lawful alternative identifier, responsible manufacturer, production date where known, as-built configuration, production facility and source completion record. The binding shall be confirmed by a manufacturer-authenticated record or documented physical and authoritative checks appropriate to the pathway.

Expected evidence: Vehicle source record; VIN observation or authenticated feed; configuration binding. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-08.02 VIN validation

VIN validation shall use the applicable market and manufacturing-period rules. A 17-character format or check-digit test shall not be imposed on legitimate historic or exceptional identifiers without the profile requiring it. A successful VIN decode shall confirm only the decoded information and shall not establish legal conformity, ownership or freedom from theft.

Expected evidence: Market-specific validation result; legacy exception; source decoder provenance. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-08.03 Registration and ownership

National registration, title, licence plates, ownership and insurance shall be external relationships, not facts created by AUTOID. Such records shall be imported only under lawful authority and permitted purpose, with their source and timestamp. The public registry shall not disclose names of owners, addresses, travel history or unrestricted full VIN lists.

Expected evidence: External-source authority; access assessment; public-field exclusion test. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-08.04 Multi-stage construction

Incomplete, completed and modified vehicles shall preserve each manufacturing stage, responsible entity, source configuration, interfaces and evidence inherited or replaced. Completion shall require a review of final-stage obligations. Evidence for a chassis shall not establish conformity of a body, seating layout or completed vehicle that was outside the original scope.

Expected evidence: Stage chain; interface declarations; final-stage assessment and completion evidence. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-08.05 Repair repurposing and end of life

Material repairs, propulsion conversion, remanufacturing, battery replacement, export, dismantling and end-of-life events shall identify the reporting source, event date, affected components and configuration impact. Historical as-built data shall remain separate from current configuration. A salvage or repair report shall not establish roadworthiness unless the relevant authorized inspection supports that conclusion.

Expected evidence: Lifecycle events; repair evidence; new baseline assessment; end-of-life source. **Assessment scope:** Both.

09 Jurisdiction profiles and applicability

Global reach is achieved by adding controlled market profiles. The universal core standard defines evidence discipline; the profile defines the applicable legal route, vehicle category and dated requirements.

AID-09.01 Profile contents

Each active jurisdiction profile shall identify country or regional territory, vehicle categories, statutory route, competent bodies, binding instruments and amendments, relevant dates, conformity-production obligations, labelling, import or registration prerequisites, source links and review owner. The profile shall distinguish type approval, manufacturer self-certification, individual approval and conditional exemption routes.

Expected evidence: Versioned profile; authoritative sources; independent legal and technical review. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-09.02 Applicability matrix

Every case shall have a requirement-by-requirement matrix tied to the profile version, configuration and intended action date. Each row shall state applicable, not applicable with reasons, exempted with authority, or unresolved. It shall identify the evidence, assessment result and reviewer. A percentage completion score shall not substitute for closing each applicable requirement.

Expected evidence: Completed market matrix; applicability rationale; explicit unresolved rows. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-09.03 Temporal applicability

The reviewer shall distinguish rules triggered by new type, production date, market placement, import, first registration or continued use. Transitional provisions, extension series and end-of-series permissions shall be recorded where relevant. A later rule shall not be applied retrospectively without legal basis, and an obsolete rule shall not support a new claim outside its transition.

Expected evidence: Dated applicability assessment; transition evidence; action date and legal basis. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-09.04 Recognition limits

Recognition of an approval from another territory shall require an explicit legal or contractual basis applicable to the exact requirement, approval series, category and parties. A technical harmonization agreement shall not be assumed to confer blanket mutual recognition. Private acceptance arrangements shall be labelled contractual and shall not be described as statutory market access.

Expected evidence: Recognition basis; participating parties; covered scope; exclusions and withdrawal conditions. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-09.05 Profile maintenance

The profile owner shall monitor authoritative sources and review active profiles at least quarterly, and immediately after a material regulatory notice. Changed rules shall receive impact analysis, independent approval and a documented transition. If a profile cannot be maintained reliably, new positive statements under it shall be paused and affected records marked for review.

Expected evidence: Monitoring log; quarterly review; amendment impact; paused profile and notification records. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

10 Evidence provenance and technical sufficiency

The registry shall distinguish an applicant assertion from authenticated evidence and from an assessment conclusion. Integrity, authenticity, relevance and sufficiency are separate checks.

AID-10.01 Evidence record

Every evidence item shall record issuer, title, reference, issue date, version, subject configuration, requirement coverage, original file digest, access classification, rights to use and verification history. The original shall be preserved without replacing it with extracted text. A digest proves content consistency, not truth, competence or authority.

Expected evidence: Evidence ledger; retained original; digest comparison; rights and classification. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-10.02 Source authentication

Authority approvals shall be checked against an authorized registry, verifiable digital signature or direct issuer confirmation through an independently established channel. Manufacturer declarations shall be attributable to an authorized signatory. Applicant-supplied contact details alone shall not establish authenticity. Unconfirmed documents shall remain unverified even if their appearance is credible.

Expected evidence: Authoritative lookup; signature verification; independent confirmation and timestamp. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-10.03 Laboratory and test competence

Test evidence shall identify competent provider, authorized scope, method and edition, sample selection, configuration, equipment, calibration or traceability where relevant, conditions, results and limitations. External recognition required by a market shall be separately verified. IAF membership or provider authorization shall not be substituted for a statutory technical-service designation.

Expected evidence: Test report; competence and designation evidence; calibration and sample traceability. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-10.04 Representativeness and uncertainty

The assessor shall justify why the tested specimen, worst-case variant, simulation or calculation represents the claimed configuration range. Where the method requires measurement uncertainty or decision rules, these shall be stated and applied. Unvalidated simulation, a different build or an undisclosed deviation shall not support an unrestricted pass.

Expected evidence: Sampling rationale; worst-case selection; uncertainty and decision rule; simulation validation. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-10.05 Contradictions and provenance gaps

Conflicting approvals, missing pages, inconsistent identifiers, unexplained changes or doubtful issuer status shall trigger an evidence hold. The assessor shall record the conflict and obtain resolution from competent sources. Favourable evidence shall not be selected while contradictory material is concealed. AI-assisted extraction shall be human-verified for every decision-critical field.

Expected evidence: Conflict register; source reconciliation; extraction verification; closure decision. **Assessment scope:** Both.

11 Assessment planning and independent review

Assessment is a documented examination of identity, configuration, regulatory mapping and evidence. The method and depth must match the risk and the claimed outcome.

AID-11.01 Assessment plan

Before assessment the case manager shall approve a plan naming scope, profiles, configurations, assessor competence, evidence methods, sampling, site or witness needs, exclusions and decision route. The plan shall include counterfeit evidence, software mismatch, production variation and privacy risks. Changes to the plan shall be justified and communicated.

Expected evidence: Assessment plan; competence allocation; risk and sampling rationale. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-11.02 Verification depth

All identity bindings, authority approvals, exemptions, configuration boundaries and applicable requirement rows shall be checked. Sampling may be used for supporting recurring production records only with a justified population and escalation rule. Failure of a sampled record shall trigger expansion sufficient to bound the affected population; it shall not be averaged away.

Expected evidence: Complete mandatory-field review; sample population; exception and expansion records. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-11.03 Findings

A finding shall state the requirement, observed fact, evidence reference, affected scope, risk and corrective action needed. Findings shall be classified as critical, major or minor using the definitions in this standard. Disagreement shall be recorded and resolved through the review or appeal route; an applicant shall not edit the assessor conclusion.

Expected evidence: Finding register; objective evidence; classifications; applicant response. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-11.04 Independent technical review

A competent reviewer who did not perform the assessment shall check completeness, applicability, evidence authenticity, configuration coverage and proposed claim wording. The reviewer shall verify closure effectiveness rather than merely receipt of a corrective-action plan. Unresolved essential evidence or a failed applicable requirement shall block a positive conformity statement.

Expected evidence: Independent review record; closure verification; blocked-case example. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-11.05 Automated decision safeguards

Automated tools may detect duplication, missing data and expired evidence, but shall not make the final positive technical decision in the First Edition. Rules, model versions and extracted fields shall be logged. The operator shall validate false-positive and false-negative risks and provide a human route for correction and contesting an automated flag.

Expected evidence: Tool validation; human sign-off; rule version; contested-flag handling. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

12 Decision rules and state separation

A usable registry shows what is known, what has been assessed and what remains uncertain. A single green status would hide distinctions that determine whether a claim is trustworthy.

AID-12.01 Independent decision

A designated competent decision maker shall issue a reasoned decision based on the assessment and review records. They shall be independent of assessment and commercial influence. A positive decision shall require every applicable requirement closed as conforming or justified not applicable, no unresolved critical or major finding, and no unresolved minor finding affecting the claimed scope.

Expected evidence: Decision record; separation checks; complete checklist and finding closure. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-12.02 Identity state

Identity state shall be draft, verified, disputed, suspended or retired. Verified shall mean that the entity identity and authority to maintain it were checked; it shall not assert technical or legal conformity. Disputed shall indicate unresolved identity evidence; suspended shall indicate a protective restriction. Retired shall preserve historical reference and shall not erase linked safety information.

Expected evidence: State definitions; transition log; public state labels. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-12.03 Assessment and legal state

Each scoped assessment shall have its own state: not_assessed, in_review, verified, refused, suspended, withdrawn or superseded. External legal status shall independently record not_checked, reported_valid, reported_restricted, reported_expired or reported_withdrawn, with source and checked-at time. A private assessment decision shall never automatically change an external authority status.

Expected evidence: Separate status fields; source provenance; transition tests. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-12.04 Currency and alerts

Evidence currency shall be current, review_due or stale, independent of identity and assessment states. Safety alerts shall also be separate: none_reported, open or resolved, with source coverage. No expiry date shall be invented for a source approval. The registry shall display the last authoritative check, next review date and limitations of recall coverage.

Expected evidence: Currency policy; last and next checks; approval validity source; alert labels. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-12.05 Effective verification result

A current positive AUTOID conformity display shall require verified identity, verified scoped assessment, current evidence, an exact configuration match and no blocking restriction. Open safety alerts shall always be visible, even when they do not invalidate the underlying type evidence. Unavailable, stale or incomplete data shall yield an explicit unavailable or qualified result, never an implied pass.

Expected evidence: Effective-result rules; blocked and stale fixtures; public output samples. **Assessment scope:** Both.

13 Publication verification and mark use

Public information must be understandable without revealing confidential evidence. The displayed meaning shall match the actual review rather than the commercial ambition of the applicant.

AID-13.01 Public minimum record

The public model record shall show AUTOID, legal manufacturer, model aliases, object class, identity state, configuration scope, separately listed markets and routes, assessment state, evidence currency, material restrictions, safety notices, issuer, verification timestamp and correction channel. Personal contacts, private unit identifiers and complete technical evidence shall remain restricted.

Expected evidence: Public field allowlist; published sample; privacy and scope review. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-13.02 Resolvable reference

A QR code or link shall resolve through an operator-controlled HTTPS service to the exact record. It shall contain no credentials or personal data. Printed records shall show the identifier in text as well as the link. A changed domain shall preserve controlled redirects and verification continuity; a guessed or unapproved endpoint shall not be printed on operational labels.

Expected evidence: QR scan test; domain control; exact-object resolution; redirect continuity. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-13.03 Claims and licence

Use of the IAF name, AUTOID symbol or verification statement shall require the applicable written licence and current authorized scope. AUTOID identity, IAF recognition, AutoSafe rating and a government approval shall be distinct claims. A mark shall not mimic a statutory approval mark or suggest acceptance by authorities that have not granted it.

Expected evidence: Mark licence; approved artwork; website and label claim audit. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-13.04 Signed extracts

An extract shall identify its issue time, exact record and revision, scope, issuer and online status-check route. A signature shall protect integrity and attribution; it shall not turn a historical extract into current evidence. Offline use shall show its freshness limit and shall not claim to know later revocations or recalls.

Expected evidence: Signed extract specimen; signature validation; stale/offline presentation test. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-13.05 Correction and withdrawal display

Material corrections, suspensions and withdrawals shall propagate to public verification and authorized downstream recipients. Earlier extracts shall remain identifiable as historical. A withdrawn statement shall not be silently deleted or replaced by a clean identifier. Publication shall balance public safety and transparency with lawful confidentiality and proportionality.

Expected evidence: Propagation logs; corrected display; historic extract handling; notification evidence. **Assessment scope:** Both.

14 Production conformity and vehicle population

Type evidence describes a design. Linking production vehicles requires evidence that the population corresponds to that design and that later production changes remain controlled.

AID-14.01 Production evidence

Where a case claims production conformity, the dossier shall identify facilities, production period, quality controls, source conformity-of-production arrangements and responsible manufacturer. The required statutory arrangements shall be verified under the market profile. A quality-management certificate alone shall not establish conformity of every produced vehicle.

Expected evidence: Production plan; official production-conformity evidence where applicable; facility scope. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-14.02 As-built traceability

The manufacturer shall maintain a controlled mapping from each claimed vehicle or defined batch to its as-built configuration and relevant safety-critical component or software records. The submitted population shall be reconcilable to production records. Retrofitted changes shall not overwrite the original build state.

Expected evidence: Build ledger; batch reconciliation; component traceability; change history. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-14.03 Population boundaries

Evidence claiming a series of vehicles shall specify applicable VIN ranges or an explicit protected list, production dates, facilities, variants and exclusions. A numerical range shall not include unrelated vehicles or assume sequential numbering. The operator shall verify that each included unit satisfies the selection rule before returning a unit-level result.

Expected evidence: Population query; explicit exclusions; representative and boundary vehicle checks. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-14.04 Production deviations

A nonconforming production lot or change in critical supplier shall trigger a documented impact assessment. Affected units shall be identifiable and restricted as needed. Release shall require verified containment, corrective action, technical evidence and any necessary authority action; a model-level statement shall not clear a defective lot.

Expected evidence: Deviation record; affected population; containment and release evidence. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-14.05 Ongoing production review

The case maintenance plan shall set review intervals and triggers based on product risk, production variability, official obligations and evidence reliability. The default AUTOID case review shall be at least annually, with earlier review where required. This is an evidence maintenance interval, not an invented expiry period for an official approval.

Expected evidence: Risk-based maintenance plan; annual review; event-trigger log. **Assessment scope:** Both.

15 Change control and transfer of evidence

A change may preserve identity while altering what evidence supports. The registry must make this visible without losing the original decision context.

AID-15.01 Change notification

Participants shall notify material identity, configuration, issuer, manufacturing or legal-status changes before extending an AUTOID claim to the changed scope. A safety-critical event discovered after release shall follow the urgent notification procedure. The notice shall identify the affected objects, earliest known effective date, source and provisional containment.

Expected evidence: Change request; timing; affected-object graph; containment. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-15.02 Delta assessment

The assessor shall identify every requirement and evidence item affected by a change. Evidence may be carried forward only with an approved technical rationale addressing interfaces, worst-case assumptions, authority conditions and configuration limits. Unaffected documents may be reused by reference; a copied approval number shall not establish applicability.

Expected evidence: Delta matrix; carry-forward rationale; required additional tests and approvals. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-15.03 Supersession

A replacement assessment shall link to the prior assessment and state whether the earlier statement remains valid for its original configuration. Superseded shall mean replaced for the identified scope, not fraudulent or legally withdrawn. A newer model-year release shall not automatically invalidate correctly identified older vehicles.

Expected evidence: Supersession relationship; scope boundary; retained historical result. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-15.04 Transfer and migration

A new data steward, software platform or registry operator shall preserve identifiers, source attribution, access rights, history, status and pending obligations. Migration shall reconcile counts and digests, validate high-risk records and test verification links before cutover. A transfer shall not create new regulatory acceptance or erase unresolved findings.

Expected evidence: Migration mapping; reconciliations; acceptance tests; responsibility transfer. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-15.05 Emergency correction

A material public error shall be contained promptly through a restriction or correction notice. The operator shall preserve the erroneous revision in restricted audit history, establish the correct source, obtain independent authorization and notify affected relying parties. An emergency correction shall receive retrospective process review within two working days.

Expected evidence: Incident timeline; corrected revision; independent authorization; retrospective review. **Assessment scope:** Both.

16 Monitoring currency and continuing assurance

A database remains useful only while changes to its evidence are detected. Current means current within a declared observation process, not continuous knowledge of every authority or vehicle.

AID-16.01 Source monitoring

The operator shall define authoritative source coverage for each profile and monitor connected feeds at their agreed interval. High-risk approval and recall sources shall be checked at least daily where lawfully available. Where only manual checks are possible, the interval and residual gap shall be disclosed and approved; unsupported real-time claims shall be prohibited.

Expected evidence: Source coverage catalogue; monitoring schedule; feed and manual-check logs. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-16.02 Freshness policy

Each source class shall have a maximum age and an outage rule approved in the profile. Once that age is exceeded, dependent assertions shall become stale or review_due and cease to appear as current positive results. Renewal shall require a successful source check or a documented alternative confirmation meeting the same authenticity standard.

Expected evidence: Freshness thresholds; automatic stale transition; successful recheck record. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-16.03 Risk-based surveillance

Surveillance shall consider safety criticality, new technology, evidence defects, production change, complaints, issuer reliability and past nonconformity. The operator shall increase review depth when risk rises and record the rationale for reducing it. Commercial importance shall not justify reduced monitoring.

Expected evidence: Risk score rationale; surveillance plan; triggered expanded review. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-16.04 Provider or issuer restriction

Suspension or withdrawal of a laboratory, technical service or issuer shall trigger an impact review of related evidence and cases. Historical results shall not be invalidated automatically solely because of a later organizational restriction. The review shall establish dates, reasons, affected scope and whether original evidence remains trustworthy.

Expected evidence: Issuer event; dependency list; temporal and scope impact decision. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-16.05 Quality indicators

Management shall review duplicate rates, unresolved findings, source freshness, status propagation delay, appeal outcomes, privacy incidents, uptime and recovery tests at least quarterly. Targets shall not reward approval volume or suppress adverse findings. Repeated failures shall lead to corrective action and restriction of affected services until controlled.

Expected evidence: Quarterly dashboard; corrective actions; service restriction decisions. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

17 Safety events recalls and protective action

AUTOID shall make known safety information traceable while preserving the authority and responsibilities of manufacturers and public bodies. Absence of a reported recall shall never be a safety guarantee.

AID-17.01 Urgent notification

A participant becoming aware of a credible serious safety risk, false approval, cloned identity or materially compromised signing key shall notify the AUTOID duty function without undue delay and within 24 hours. This programme deadline shall not extend any shorter legal duty. Initial reporting shall proceed with known facts and be updated as evidence develops.

Expected evidence: Incident report; awareness and notification timestamps; applicable legal deadlines. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-17.02 Protective restriction

The duty function shall triage a credible critical event within four hours of receipt, restrict misleading positive displays where needed and preserve evidence. The restriction shall identify affected scope and be reviewed independently within two working days. An urgent measure shall not await a fee, a routine committee meeting or complete root-cause analysis.

Expected evidence: Duty roster; triage record; restriction and independent review timestamps. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-17.03 Recall source and scope

A recall record shall identify issuing source, campaign identifier, publication and effective dates, affected configurations or vehicle population, hazard, action and verified remedy status. Manufacturer reports, authority notices and third-party allegations shall have distinct source labels. Public summaries shall not expose unnecessary personal or confidential information.

Expected evidence: Recall record; authoritative notice; population match; source classification. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-17.04 Remedy verification

A model-wide recall shall remain distinguishable from remedy completion on one vehicle. A unit shall be marked remedied only against authenticated service or manufacturer evidence with date, remedy revision and the applicable vehicle binding. A parts invoice or a closed marketing campaign shall not be sufficient by itself.

Expected evidence: Unit remedy record; source authentication; remaining affected population. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-17.05 Status propagation and closure

Critical status changes shall be committed immediately after authorization and reach public verification within 15 minutes, with downstream notices queued in the same interval. If publication cannot be trusted, the affected verification service shall show unavailable or restricted. Closure shall document containment, scope, source action, correction effectiveness and learning.

Expected evidence: Propagation measurement; outage display test; delivered notifications; closure report. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

18 Data protection confidentiality and access

Technical transparency and personal privacy shall be designed together. The global model index can be public while vehicle-level and confidential evidence remain subject to lawful access.

AID-18.01 Data inventory and lawful basis

The operator shall document purposes, categories, controller and processor roles, lawful basis, recipients, retention and cross-border arrangements for every dataset. A privacy impact assessment shall precede sensitive or large-scale vehicle linking. Consent shall not be assumed to justify all downstream use. Processing lacking an established basis shall not begin.

Expected evidence: Processing inventory; impact assessment; contracts; transfer assessment. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-18.02 Public data minimization

Public outputs shall use an explicit allowlist. They shall exclude owner names, contact details, licence plates, location traces, raw full VIN lists and unredacted confidential evidence. Vehicle verification shall use a restricted exact-match or holder-authorized token mechanism and disclose only the minimum needed result. Tokens shall be opaque, revocable and resistant to enumeration.

Expected evidence: Public schema; negative privacy tests; token design; authorized unit-lookup rules. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-18.03 Field and purpose access

Access shall be controlled by role, organization, object scope, data classification and purpose. Assessors shall see only assigned cases; applicants shall not see competitors. Privileged access shall require strong authentication, time limits where practical and auditable approval. Possessing an AUTOID or knowing a VIN shall not grant access to restricted evidence.

Expected evidence: Access matrix; cross-tenant tests; privilege approvals; access review. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-18.04 Rights and correction

The privacy function shall provide a route for access, correction, objection, restriction and deletion requests as applicable. It shall verify the requester without collecting unnecessary identity material and track local legal deadlines. Technical corrections shall preserve a proportionate audit record while removing unlawfully retained personal data from active systems and scheduled backups.

Expected evidence: Rights case log; identity check; correction and deletion evidence. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-18.05 Confidentiality and disclosure

Evidence owners shall classify trade secrets and grant sufficient rights for assessment, maintenance, appeal and lawful authority access. Public safety notices shall use proportionate disclosure. Confidentiality shall not prevent legally required reporting or a fair independent appeal; controlled extracts or secure review shall be used where full disclosure is unjustified.

Expected evidence: Data licence; classification review; redacted evidence; lawful-disclosure record. **Assessment scope:** Both.

19 Security integrity and service resilience

The service must resist forged evidence, malicious changes and misleading status displays. A reliable audit trail requires protected storage and external accountability, not merely a database timestamp.

AID-19.01 Security baseline

The operator shall maintain threat models for identity fraud, account takeover, insider alteration, ransomware, tenant escape, API abuse and status-cache failure. Transport encryption, encryption of sensitive stored data, strong authentication, least privilege, vulnerability management and monitored audit logs shall be implemented before operation. An independent penetration test shall cover both public and privileged functions.

Expected evidence: Threat model; baseline configuration; penetration-test closure; monitoring coverage. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-19.02 Signing and trust

Signing keys shall be held in protected key-management infrastructure, separated from application administrators and governed by dual control for critical actions. The trust register shall record algorithm, key identifier, issuer, validity and revocation. Verifiers shall reject unknown algorithms, untrusted issuers and altered payloads; a valid signature alone shall not assert current approval.

Expected evidence: Key lifecycle procedure; trust data; negative signature and revocation tests. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-19.03 Append-only history

Material revisions, decisions and lifecycle events shall be append-only in the application, with actor, reason, effective time, recording time and prior-event relationship. Corrections shall add events rather than overwrite history. Tamper detection shall combine protected audit storage, periodic independent digests and controlled administration; hash chaining alone shall not be treated as tamper prevention.

Expected evidence: Event ledger; correction example; immutable backup or audit export; tamper alert test. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-19.04 Recovery and continuity

The service shall target at least 99.9 percent monthly availability for public verification, a recovery time of four hours and recovery point of 15 minutes for transactional records. These are scheme design targets, not claims of achieved performance. Restore tests shall verify record counts, permissions, signatures, latest restrictions and status freshness at least quarterly.

Expected evidence: Measured service report; backup design; quarterly restoration and restriction reconciliation. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-19.05 Incident and exit readiness

Security incidents shall have defined containment, evidence preservation, notification and recovery roles with jurisdiction-specific legal deadlines. Operator insolvency or service closure shall trigger a funded continuity or escrow arrangement preserving lawful verification and identifier history. Personal data shall not be retained permanently solely to support an indiscriminate archive.

Expected evidence: Incident exercises; legal notification matrix; continuity agreement; exit and deletion plan. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

20 Interoperability and federated operation

The registry shall be portable and open to authorized integration. Global growth shall not depend on a single software supplier or on claiming unrestricted access to official systems.

AID-20.01 Published interfaces

The operator shall publish versioned data dictionaries, machine-readable schemas, export rules and an API contract for permitted functions. Values shall include explicit units, enumerations, timestamps and source provenance. Unsupported fields or unknown status values shall fail validation rather than silently default to a favourable meaning.

Expected evidence: Schema and API versions; validation tests; complete export and reimport. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-20.02 Controlled exchange

Integrations with authority systems, VIN datasets, recalls and battery passports shall identify lawful access, permitted uses, update interval, source limitations and reconciliation. Scraped or decoded information shall retain its source class. No connector shall imply partnership, regulatory endorsement or access to a restricted database without documented authorization.

Expected evidence: Connector register; agreements; mappings; attribution and access controls. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-20.03 Federation consistency

Regional nodes may collect and validate submissions under contract, but the authoritative allocation and current-status service shall prevent divergent identities or positive states. A partitioned node shall not publish new positive decisions until synchronized. Conflict resolution shall preserve both submissions, identify the competent decision and record the canonical outcome.

Expected evidence: Node agreement; partition test; reconciliation and conflict decision. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-20.04 Portable verification

Authorized recipients shall be able to export a record with its schema version, provenance, evidence references, decision and status history in documented formats. Exports shall preserve privacy and intellectual-property restrictions. Vendor migration shall be demonstrated using a second implementation or independent parser before operational release.

Expected evidence: Export bundle; independent parse and round-trip test; rights controls. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-20.05 Schema changes

Breaking changes shall use a new major interface version and documented migration. Existing identifiers shall remain stable. Clients shall receive at least 90 calendar days notice for non-emergency removal of a supported interface; urgent security changes may use shorter notice with recorded necessity and a tested transition route.

Expected evidence: Version policy; compatibility matrix; deprecation notice; migration validation. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

21 Records retention and auditability

The system shall retain enough evidence to explain decisions throughout the relevant product lifecycle while applying explicit deletion and legal-hold rules.

AID-21.01 Complete case record

A case record shall contain application, authority to submit, profile and configuration versions, evidence inventory, assessment, independent review, decision, publication approval, notifications and maintenance events. References shall resolve to controlled records. A missing decision-critical original shall trigger review of the affected statement rather than silent reconstruction.

Expected evidence: Complete case index; linked originals; retrieval and missing-record test. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-21.02 Retention schedule

Before activation the operator shall approve a dataset-specific retention schedule with purpose, trigger, duration, legal basis, custodian and disposal method. Technical decision evidence shall normally be retained for the supported lifecycle and an approved claims period; exact periods shall be set by the profile and applicable law. Personal data shall not inherit an unlimited technical retention rule.

Expected evidence: Approved schedule; jurisdiction validation; retention trigger configuration. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-21.03 Legal holds and deletion

A documented hold shall suspend disposal only for relevant records and periods. Release shall be authorized and restore normal disposal. Deletion shall address indexes, derived datasets, replicas and backup expiry, and create a non-sensitive disposal record. Hashes or pseudonyms that remain linkable to individuals shall still receive appropriate protection.

Expected evidence: Hold register; scoped deletion run; backup expiry; disposal certificate. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-21.04 Audit and review

An internal audit independent of the audited activity shall assess all operator requirements at least annually. The first operational release shall include an independent readiness assessment. Management shall review findings, appeal trends, legal changes, staffing, impartiality and continuity, and assign corrective actions with owners and effectiveness checks.

Expected evidence: Audit programme; readiness report; management review; corrective-action closure. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-21.05 Historical reconstruction

The operator shall demonstrate reconstruction of a decision as it stood at a specified time, including source version, configuration, reviewer, legal-source check and public display. Both effective and recording times shall be retained so a later correction cannot be mistaken for knowledge available at the earlier decision.

Expected evidence: Time-specific reconstruction test; bitemporal event data; original display snapshot. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

22 Complaints appeals and disputed records

The remedy process shall correct mistakes without weakening urgent safety measures or allowing the original decision function to judge its own work.

AID-22.01 Complaint access

Any affected person shall have an accessible route to report inaccurate records, improper claims, conduct or process failures. The Secretariat shall acknowledge a complaint within seven calendar days, provide an initial response within 30 days and normally determine it within 60 days. Extensions shall state reasons and a revised date.

Expected evidence: Complaint channel; acknowledgement; initial and final response dates. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-22.02 Appeal filing and panel

An affected party may appeal an AUTOID decision within 30 calendar days of notification. A three-person independent case panel shall be constituted through the Appeals Committee roster and rotation procedure under the Constitution. Conflicted officials shall not choose the panel. External professionals shall be used if independent competence is unavailable internally.

Expected evidence: Notification and filing dates; panel appointment; competence and conflict checks. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-22.03 Fair review

The panel shall review the original record, applicable rules and submissions, provide a meaningful opportunity to respond, and issue reasons normally within 60 calendar days. It may affirm, set aside or remit the decision within its remit. Required further technical evaluation shall be assigned independently; the panel shall not invent a public authority power.

Expected evidence: Appeal case file; submissions; reasoned determination; implementation instructions. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-22.04 Interim protection

An appeal shall not automatically remove a justified protective restriction. The panel shall consider proportional interim measures on request, balancing evidence, fairness and safety. Public records shall distinguish an IAF dispute from an authority withdrawal and shall avoid publishing unsubstantiated allegations as established facts.

Expected evidence: Interim decision; risk rationale; correctly labelled public dispute. **Assessment scope:** Both.

AID-22.05 Implementation and learning

Appeal outcomes and substantiated complaints shall lead to authorized corrections, notifications and systemic corrective action where needed. The Secretariat shall verify implementation before closure. Good-faith reporters shall be protected against retaliation, and internal processes shall not obstruct lawful external reporting or non-excludable remedies.

Expected evidence: Implemented outcome; notifications; effectiveness check; protected reporting record. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

23 Provider qualification and competence

A recognized provider is trusted only for a defined function. Registry operation, evidence assessment, testing and statutory approval require different competences and authorities.

AID-23.01 Written authorization

A body acting in the IAF name shall hold written corporate approval, an effective Cooperation and Authorization Memorandum and a scope schedule before operation. The instruments shall define functions, territories, personnel competence, oversight, data rights, marks and termination. Ordinary membership or a general partnership announcement shall not confer service authorization.

Expected evidence: Approval; executed memorandum; published scope schedule. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-23.02 Competence criteria

Assessors shall demonstrate relevant vehicle technology, regulatory-route knowledge, evidence evaluation, configuration control and data integrity competence. Decision makers shall additionally demonstrate decision-rule and impartiality competence. Qualification shall include supervised casework and witnessed performance, not attendance at training alone. Authorization shall name category and market limits.

Expected evidence: Competence matrix; witnessed cases; qualification decision; scope limits. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-23.03 Ongoing competence

The operator shall review authorized personnel at least annually and after material rule or technology changes. Poor performance, integrity concerns or scope gaps shall lead to supervised restriction, retraining or withdrawal. A person shall not assess a new category or jurisdiction until the relevant competence is verified.

Expected evidence: Annual review; continuing development; performance records; scope restriction. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-23.04 Subcontractors

Subcontracting shall preserve responsibility, confidentiality, competence and independence. The applicant shall be informed where required, and access shall be limited to the assignment. A subcontractor shall not use IAF marks or issue decisions beyond explicit authorization. The operator shall retain the ability to audit work and retrieve records after termination.

Expected evidence: Subcontract agreement; authorization; competence and access audit. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-23.05 Provider exit

Suspension or termination shall include a case and data transition plan, notification to affected parties, protection of records and removal of unauthorized claims. Prior outcomes shall receive a risk-based review rather than automatic blanket invalidation. Active safety obligations and appeals shall remain assigned to an accountable function.

Expected evidence: Exit plan; case reassignment; mark removal; historical-result review. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

24 Adoption validation and controlled expansion

International acceptance must be earned through consultation, repeatable evidence checks, useful interfaces and lawful arrangements. A launch announcement cannot establish recognition by external authorities.

AID-24.01 Consultation

A new or materially changed AUTOID requirement shall normally receive 60 calendar days of stakeholder consultation, with at least the constitutional minimum where applicable. The process shall invite manufacturers, authorities, technical services, laboratories, SMEs, consumers, privacy specialists and software providers. Comments, dispositions and material dissent shall be recorded before authorization.

Expected evidence: Consultation notice; balanced participation; comment disposition; release authorization. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-24.02 Pilot acceptance

A pilot shall test at least two distinct regulatory routes, five independent organizations, 20 model or configuration cases and 1,000 synthetic or lawfully authorized vehicle records. It shall include duplicates, forged evidence, recalls, software changes, privacy attacks, outages and appeals. These proposed minimums test process coverage and shall not be described as statistical proof of global validity.

Expected evidence: Pilot protocol; coverage matrix; failures and remediation; independent report. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-24.03 Go-live criteria

Operational release shall require zero open critical or major findings, closure of all applicable launch requirements, successful recovery and status-propagation tests, verified privacy controls and independent decision capacity. Unfinished optional modules shall be disabled and excluded from claims. A Council release shall identify precisely which markets, categories and functions are available.

Expected evidence: Signed go-live checklist; test results; disabled modules; approved service catalogue. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-24.04 External acceptance programme

Each proposed acceptance relationship shall define recipient, use case, technical and legal basis, covered outputs, review obligations, data exchange, liability, termination and public wording. The operator shall distinguish evaluation, pilot participation, contractual reliance and statutory recognition. No agreement shall be announced as effective before execution and satisfaction of its conditions.

Expected evidence: Acceptance agreement; scope; effective conditions; approved announcement. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

AID-24.05 Expansion and review

New markets, vehicle categories, automated decisions or delegated issuance shall pass the same design, competence, consultation, security and release gates proportionate to their risk. The standard shall receive at least an annual maintenance review and a recorded revision decision. Identifiers and historical interpretations shall remain traceable across editions.

Expected evidence: Expansion dossier; annual maintenance; transition plan; historical compatibility test. **Assessment scope:** Operator.

Annex A Mandatory record groups

The following groups are mandatory to the extent applicable to the object and claim. The Technical Specification defines field types, validation and interfaces. Classification and access controls apply to every field; mandatory collection does not mean mandatory public disclosure.

Record group	Required content
Object identity	Class-coded ID; verified legal manufacturer; engineering family; aliases; parent and related objects; responsible steward; identity state
Configuration	Variant; frozen hardware and software manifest; approval-relevant limits; production stage; range and exclusions; source and manifest digest
Vehicle	Protected VIN or lawful alternative; source of binding; as-built configuration; production date and facility where available; dated current-state changes
Market scope	Territory; category; route; profile ID and version; intended action and trigger date; recognition or exemption basis
Evidence	Issuer and scope; reference and edition; original digest; authentication; requirements covered; configuration applicability; rights and confidentiality
Assessment	Complete row-level matrix; methods; samples; findings; closures; assessor and reviewer; explicit exclusions
Decision	Independent authorized decider; rationale; exact scope; claim text; decision date; review date; restrictions; appeal notice
Status	Identity, assessment, external source, currency and safety-alert states kept separate; source checked-at and freshness; any genuine source expiry
Lifecycle	Effective and recording times; source; reason; affected population; predecessor and successor; recall and unit-remedy evidence
Public verification	Allowlisted summary; scope and limitations; issuer; timestamp; current-result explanation; verification reference; correction route
Audit and access	Actor; authority; case and tenant; data classification; approved disclosure; retention rule; legal hold and disposal where relevant

Annex B Approved claim patterns

Identity-only record

AUTOID [identifier] identifies the declared [object class] and its responsible manufacturer within the IAF registry. Identity verification does not establish technical conformity or permission to market or register a vehicle. Technical assessment status: [not assessed or actual scoped state].

Scoped scheme conformity statement

IAF AUTOID scheme requirements have been assessed as met for [configuration ID and defined scope] under [profile ID and version, territory and route], based on the evidence and independent decision recorded as [reference]. Source status was checked on [date and time]. Current limitations, safety notices and review status are available through the verification record. This statement does not replace the applicable public-authority decision or manufacturer legal responsibility.

External approval source statement

An approval record issued by [verified authority] under [source scheme and reference] was authenticated for [covered configuration and scope]. Reported source status: [status] as checked on [date and time]. Any permission or recognition follows the source authority and applicable law, not the AUTOID identifier.

Prohibited claim patterns

Do not use globally road legal, approved in all countries, replaces all type approvals, no recalls guaranteed, government recognized without a verified instrument, or an unqualified approved badge that obscures the actual source and scope. Do not imply that a valid signature proves current legal status or that a VIN decode proves compliance.

Annex C Scope selection and extension

Assessment profile	Required case coverage	Additional operator evidence
Model and configuration	All relevant Both controls; documented jurisdiction, evidence, configuration and decision scope	All Operator controls through current operator assessment
Individual vehicle	Model/configuration coverage plus unit binding, as-built state, population and lifecycle controls	Restricted identifier vault and lawful unit access
Prototype identity only	Verified organization, object boundary, allocation, privacy and explicit prototype limitations	No production conformity display; prototype pathway approved
Provider or regional node	Authorization, competence, impartiality, delegated duties, access and continuity	No independent positive issuance beyond written delegation

The first operational catalogue shall name each active category and market. The core is designed for international use, but a global architecture is not evidence that every jurisdiction profile has been completed. Future profiles for additional vehicle classes and technologies shall pass the same controlled extension process.